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ABSTRACT 
Despite increased awareness of cybersecurity incidents and 
consequences, organisations still struggle to convince employees to 
comply with information security policies and engage in effective 
cyber prevention. Here we introduce and evaluate The 
Cybersurvival Task, a ranking task that highlights cybersecurity 
misconceptions amongst employees and that serves as a reflective 
exercise for security experts. We describe an initial deployment and 
refinement of the task in one organisation and a second deployment 
and evaluation in another. We show how the Cybersurvival Task 
could be used to detect ‘shadow security’ cultures within an 
organisation and illustrate how a group discussion about the 
importance of different cyber behaviours led to the weakening of 
staff’s cybersecurity positions (i.e. more disagreement with 
experts). We also discuss its use as a tool to inform organisational 
policy-making and the design of campaigns and training events, 
ensuring that they are better tailored to specific staff groups and 
designed to target problematic behaviours.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The number and scale of cyber-attacks targeted at organisations 
over the past few years is unprecedented. These include hackers 
compromising 55 million voter records in the Philippines, hospitals 
worldwide hit by ransomware attacks, 33 million Twitter user 
names and passwords being compromised, and 11.5 million 
documents relating to offshore accounts of international politicians, 
business leaders and celebrities being leaked from a law firm [51]. 
Many major breaches still go unreported, with only a quarter of 
businesses in the UK reporting their major breaches last year [33]. 
Business email compromise, ransomware, and phishing are cited 
across industries as the top vector of compromise. In many of these 
cases, the attack vector involves the employee. Organisations and 
their employees understand that they have a responsibility to 
change employee behaviour as an important tool in their defence 
strategy, yet there is very little consensus about exactly what 
protective behaviours are to be advocated and prioritised. Security 
practitioners, policy-makers, managers, and employees tend to 
advocate different approaches and the end result is that users 
receive conflicting advice, become sceptical about the information 
they are given, and are consequently less proactive in cyber defence 
than they might otherwise be [9, 35].  
Organisations typically have one or more policies addressing 
appropriate cybersecurity behaviour, referred to as security policies 
from here on. There is now significant literature that describes those 
factors that influence employees’ intentions to comply with 
security policies [21, 31, 37, 46] and further literature documenting 
poor outcomes from cybersecurity awareness campaigns and 
organisational training initiatives [5, 41, 49, 55]. Sometimes the 
reason for these failures is straightforward. For example, security 
policies are often inaccessible or buried deep within an 
organisation’s website, tend to be over-complex, incomprehensible 
and/or poorly tailored to staff needs and workload [39]. They are 
generally poor calls to action, not least because of the 
aforementioned confusion about the protective actions they 
promote. This is a particular problem when we consider the 
psychology of threat, where we know that highlighting the threat to 
a user, without also offering them a simple, consistent response to 
that threat, produces ‘defensive’ reactions that can include simply 
ignoring the problem and continuing to engage in old behaviours 
[29]. 
One example is the conflicting advice surrounding the password, 
where standard advice was once to create strong, unique passwords 
for every user account involving combinations of letters, numbers 
and ‘special’ characters. Recently, this advice has been supplanted 
(e.g. by NIST and GCHQ) with a ‘three random words’ instruction 
for password creation [25]. This would seem to constitute an 
advance, but can lead to greater confusion on the part of the end 
user as many current accounts still enforce ‘strong’ passwords 
requiring multiple character types, effectively rendering GCHQ 
and NIST advice useless in that particular context.  
In this paper, we focus on the consensus problem in cyber 
protection and describe a tool (The Cybersurvival Task) that 
highlights the many different behaviours encompassed by a 
cybersecurity policy and the mental models held by members of an 
organisation. The task requires users to rank protective behaviours 
in terms of their effectiveness as a cybersecurity defence. Unlike 
other self-report measurement tools (e.g. [19]), these rankings 
provide a means for staff to disclose their assumptions in a 
structured way, so that organisations can understand where 
employee confusion and associated defensive responding might be 
taking place. Most importantly, the process allows for 
organisational security experts to reflect upon their policy and 
training priorities, based on direct feedback from their own 
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employees. The ultimate aim is that the Cybersurvival Task could 
inform the development of organisational policy-making and the 
design of campaigns and training events, ensuring that they are 
better tailored to specific staff groups and/or misconceptions. Here, 
we describe the development of the task and describe a process 
whereby we piloted the task in one institution, made some 
refinements, and then conducted an evaluation of the final task in a 
second institution. We show how the task highlighted 
misconceptions and revealed behavioural discrepancies between 
experts and employees, and between different employee groups, 
and discuss how organisations can benefit from the Cybersurvival 
Task. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 The Human Factor in Cyber Protection 
Organisations face a growing range of security threats, including 
denial of service (DoS) and ransomware attacks that aim to take 
down a business or service, as well as social engineering attacks 
that are designed to obtain and exploit private information. While 
it may be possible to stay safe from such attacks by improving and 
maintaining the organisation’s technical defences – e.g. firewalls 
and anti-virus software – employees have often been labelled as the 
‘weak link’ in the security ecosystem (e.g. [53]). In recent years, 
this weak link argument has been replaced by an understanding that 
humans, far from being ‘the enemy’ [2] are an integral part of the 
whole system and that a proper understanding of human behaviour 
and of employee motivation should inform the cybersecurity design 
process [45].  
Much of the work in this space has focused upon the fact that 
cybersecurity does not comprise the primary task for most 
employees. Unsurprisingly, people attend to their primary work 
tasks and tend to overlook security actions. Beautement, Sasse, & 
Wonham [8] have suggested that employees have a relatively small 
‘compliance budget’ that they can allocate to security procedures 
and that this can shrink when job demands are particularly high or 
the protective behaviours demanded of users are too onerous. There 
are unrealistic expectations that users will create a strong password 
for every unique account they have [56], that they will be vigilant 
in checking for phishing emails they receive [54] or that they will 
simply not click on any links or open any email attachment in the 
workplace [27]. The reality is that the vast majority of people reuse 
simple passwords [1, 26] and that almost half of all users are likely 
to fall for phishing emails, with some 17% on average entering 
credentials on phishing websites [12]. 
2.2 The Non-Compliance Problem 
There is often a disconnect between how organisations would like 
their employees to behave and how the employees actually behave 
and this is an important consideration for computer security (e.g. 
[8, 30]). Much of the existing organisational research tends to focus 
upon this as a ‘policy compliance problem’ rather than see it more 
holistically as an issue around the ways that employees come to 
understand both the cybersecurity threat and the kinds of protective 
security behaviours they can use to ameliorate that threat. This is 
important, because employees do not typically gain their 
understanding directly from security policies, but rather from their 
work peers and from the media, building up a set of shadow security 
beliefs and behaviours [34] that deviate from company policy. In 
other words, employees reach a compromise between security and 
productivity that allows them to achieve their work goals by 
utilising non-compliant but sufficient security behaviours.  
Regardless, many organisational policies and procedures are 
simply not fit for purpose. There are issues with policies that are 
too dense and contain tracts of information that are irrelevant for 
many users. There are also issues with policies that are too vague 
and provide very little in the way of useful information [3]. 
Unsurprisingly there are also many organisations that have no 
security policies in place and many users who are simply unaware 
of their own organisation’s stance on cybersecurity behaviour. In 
short, it is not easy for organisations to develop usable 
cybersecurity policies to keep employees safe. 
2.3 Choosing the ‘Right’ Behaviour 
We noted that users often struggle to protect themselves and their 
organisation online, and part of the problem is that they are given 
inconsistent advice about what actions to take. As cyber security 
experts differ in their opinion of the skills and behaviours that are 
important [13], so too do the security policies they create. This 
means security policies vary between organisations and include 
many different behaviours associated with accessing, categorising, 
storing, and transferring data – but may also cover general 
computer user policies including internet and email behaviours and 
use of external devices (USBs, personal devices). With this in mind, 
researchers at Google distributed a survey to both security experts 
(those having at least 5 years of experience working or studying in 
computer security) and security non-experts (Mechanical Turk 
workers) and found a discrepancy between online security 
behaviours reported as essential between the expert and non-expert 
group [32]. Most importantly, the researchers compiled a list of 
advice considered ‘good’ by experts consisting of 20 items. While 
this list constitutes a step in the right direction for identifying 
security behaviours that are important for staying safe online – for 
both policy creation and advice-generation – this advice is based on 
both academic and industry experts which may have contrasting 
views on a number of topics [32]. Additionally, this list is based on 
‘good’ advice, defined as advice that is both effective and realistic, 
which potentially means that security behaviours that are very 
important for the organisation may have been pushed down the list. 
Finally, the list was compiled for the average internet user, meaning 
that some behaviours may not apply to everyone and this is already 
a problem faced by users who are overloaded with occasionally 
irrelevant advice [30]. In a corporate environment where job roles 
are clearly defined and responsibilities differ across individuals, 
such a generic list will likely offer excessive or irrelevant advice to 
individuals. 
2.4 Measuring Security Behaviours and 
Beliefs 
We have highlighted the problems that organisations face when 
writing security policies, so it is no surprise that enforcing the 
policy becomes even more challenging. But how can organisations 
understand what their employees are doing in the security 
spectrum?  
Direct measurement of actual security behaviour in a live 
environment has proved elusive for cybersecurity researchers and 
many have adopted self-report scales as workable alternatives. 
These, of course, measure intentions to behave in a certain way and 
assume there are no barriers to converting these intentions into 
actual behaviour. A range of psychometric scales have been 
developed and these typically include different behavioural items 
where participants are asked to rate the likelihood of complying or 
agreement with the behavioural statements. For example, Egelman 
  
& Peer [19] start off with 30 items which they reduce to 16 security 
behaviours covering 3 security topics, whereas Parsons et al. [48] 
list 63 different behaviours covering 7 topics. However, Wash et al. 
[61] found that people are poor at self-reporting security 
behaviours, as they may not understand what the behaviours are 
and may underreport less salient behaviours. This has important 
implications for the validity of such scales. 
With this in mind, a different approach to measuring and observing 
behaviour may be necessary and in this paper we consider the 
advantages of ranking behaviours instead of rating them. The 
inspiration from this work comes from two seminal examples of 
ranking tasks used both to facilitate group discussions and to study 
group dynamics in occupational settings: The Desert Survival 
Situation [38] and the Moon Landing Task [16]. While these tasks 
do not measure organisationally-relevant behaviours and beliefs, 
they are worth considering here as they have been used for over 
four decades to understand the kinds of decision-processes 
individuals and groups make within the work context and to 
determine which factors are most likely to shape attitudes within 
the workplace. 
2.5 Ranking Tasks as a Measure of Work-
Related Behaviour 
The Desert Survival Task [38] places participants in a simulated 
scenario where they are stranded in the desert after a plane crash 
and must rank 15 items in order of importance for survival. 
Participants’ answers are then compared to the ‘correct’ answers – 
i.e. the rankings offered by experts – in order to indicate the 
accuracy of the individual and group rankings. The task has been a 
popular tool for understanding the behaviour of leaders in groups 
(e.g. [23, 42, 52]), evaluating group facilitation techniques (e.g. 
[58]) and exploring both individual and group decision making and 
problem-solving processes (e.g. [15, 24, 44]). The Desert Survival 
Task has also been used in disciplines other than management as a 
tool for understanding gender differences in schools [6], 
understanding what features of embodied conversation agents are 
most important for communicating feedback [40] and for 
understanding reactions to different computer personalities [20] 
amongst many others.  
Similarly, the Moon Landing Task [16] requires participants to rank 
15 items in order of importance for surviving a trip to a rescue 
vessel off the moon’s surface. Individual and group rankings are 
then compared with an expert list compiled by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The Moon 
Landing Task has been used largely as a problem-solving task in 
studies, e.g. for understanding role of stereotypical context on the 
judgement of groups [4], cognitive busyness [17, 28], and teasing 
[10]. The task has also been used to understand group interactions 
amongst children [16] and as a tool for facilitating intelligence 
expectancy judgements on peers [43]. 
3. THE CYBERSURVIVAL TASK 
The Cybersurvival Task asks participants (employees in an 
organisation) to rank the security behaviours that would best help 
protect their own organisation. This process is different from other 
security questionnaires that operate on a self-report basis, where 
users are asked to disclose whether or not they perform certain 
behaviours [19, 48]. By asking users to rank behaviours, we ensure 
that participants prioritise certain behaviours over others. By asking 
users to justify these rankings, we ensure that they articulate their 
beliefs about the benefits and drawbacks of these behaviours. 
Table 1: Overview of the Cybersurvival Task stages. 
Stage Approx. Duration 
Generate appropriate list of behaviours 
with the organisation’s security experts 
tailored to workplace 
30 minutes 
Workshops with employees 60 minutes (each) 
Reflection with experts 45 minutes 
 
The task involves a process similar to the Moon Landing and Desert 
Survival tasks – in which participants engage in both individual and 
group ranking decisions and compare them against previously-
obtained expert rankings. The major difference in this 
implementation is that the task items are highly salient to the 
cybersecurity context. In other words, the Moon Landing and 
Desert Survival tasks allowed exploration of a problem that was not 
directly relevant to the organisation in order to understand group 
dynamics in a ‘neutral’ problem space. In contrast, the 
Cybersurvival Task is highly relevant and allows not only the 
exploration of group dynamics, but the elicitation of specific mental 
models (at group and individual level) that are cybersecurity 
relevant. Critically, the Cybersurvival Task also incorporates a final 
reflection stage (see Table 1) not present in similar ranking tasks, 
where experts (those responsible for setting the security agenda in 
an organisation) can be presented with data capturing employee 
rankings, assumptions and beliefs. 
Table 2: Overview of workshop activities.  
Activity 
Approx. 
Duration 
Introduction by Facilitator 2 minutes 
Individual ranking of Cybersurvival Sheet 10 minutes 
Reveal of top 3 and bottom 3 behaviours (from 
individual rankings), plus suggestions for new 
behaviours 
10 minutes 
Group ranking of Cybersurvival Sheet – 
assisted by facilitator 
10 minutes 
Group ranking of Cybersurvival Sheet - 
independent 
15 minutes 
Reveal of expert rankings & scoring 10 minutes 
Debrief 3 minutes 
 
The task itself is simple: each participant is initially presented with 
a sheet (the Cybersurvival Sheet) consisting of n relevant security 
behaviours (agreed in advance with the organisation’s security 
experts), listed in a random order, and is required to rank those 
behaviours in order of importance for staying safe online. The task 
is conducted individually, then conducted as a group, where 
participants are encouraged to discuss and agree on the importance 
  
of the different behaviours. The discussion through which 
participants come to a group consensus is as important as the 
rankings themselves, which are then compared with those derived 
from security experts in their organisation. Each participant is given 
a set of laminated note cards with the printed behaviours that they 
can use to facilitate both the individual and group ranking process 
(e.g. by arranging the notes before committing pen to Sheet (see 
Figure 1). 
The security experts’ rankings are obtained via a similar process 
where each expert is asked to rank an initial list of behaviours (see 
3.1 below) individually, followed by a group discussion where all 
experts have to agree on an order that suits their organisation. 
Experts are allowed to add, rename, and remove any behaviours at 
any time during the process. The initial expert ranking exercise lasts 
approximately 30 minutes, while the final reflection stage lasts 
approximately 45 minutes.  
This final reflection stage highlights a striking difference between 
the Cybersurvival Task and the Dessert Survival or Moon Landing 
tasks. While the latter two tasks operate under an absolute and ‘best 
set’ of rankings, the Cybersurvival Task challenges the quality of 
the expert rankings in the final stage where they are encouraged to 
reflect on (and re-assess) their priorities and training programmes. 
The reflection stage consists of the researchers presenting the 
findings to the experts and allowing them to seek clarification on 
any of the findings (or specifics on behaviour choices). See Section 
3.3 for more information on this stage. 
We acknowledge that experts can be wrong (as we will show later), 
and by no means do we believe that the expert rankings from each 
institution necessarily represent ‘best practice’, but we do see the 
value in comparing employee rankings to their institutional experts 
as they have been tasked with setting and enforcing the security 
culture within their organisation.  
Below we describe the multi-phase process undertaken to refine 
and evaluate the Cybersurvival Task, comprising a first 
deployment, task refinement and second deployment and 
evaluation in an institution of similar character and size.  
3.1 Phase I Deployment 
The first Cybersurvival Task deployment was in a large academic 
institution (approximately 3,000 members of staff). The goal was 
to understand the ‘face validity’ of the task from the point of view 
of experts and employees and to see whether any improvement 
should be made to its structure, activities, and delivery. We were 
also interested in whether the organisational experts and employees 
believed there was any value in engaging with the Task.  
We first needed to develop a list of protective behaviours that were 
deemed relevant to the organisation, and so we conducted an initial 
workshop with two security experts from the organisation (the 
Head of IT Security and the Head of IT Services). We began with 
an initial list comprising the 20 behaviours from Ion et al.’s [32] 
study described above (see Appendix A). The two experts were 
asked to work individually and to rank the list of behaviours in 
order of their importance for protecting their organisation, and they 
were also given the chance to add and remove behaviours. Both 
experts were then asked to work together to rank the complete set 
of behaviours, including any new ones they had added. Their final 
ranked list, the ‘expert agreed list’, presented in randomised order, 
formed the Cybersurvival Sheet for employees (see Appendix B). 
We then used this sheet to run the Cybersurvival Task in four 
workshops (see Table 2 for activities) with staff in the same 
organisation, followed by one final workshop with the same experts 
who generated the initial list. Both this and the subsequent 
deployment received ethical approval from our university.  
Twenty employees were recruited using strategically-located flyers 
and email distribution lists. There were 13 support staff with roles 
ranging from procurement to personal assistants and 7 academic 
staff responsible for either research or student learning. The 20 
participants were split into four workshops of five participants 
each. One workshop consisted of solely support staff and one of 
solely academic staff, with the remaining two mixed. The activities 
and procedures in all four sessions were identical (see Table 2). 
Each workshop involved the participants ranking the behaviours on 
their own, discussing any additional behaviours with the group, and 
then ranking the behaviours again as a group, with a final ranking 
order agreed by all members of the group (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: (a) Example of the ranking sheet used in Phase II; (b) laminated note cards used to support the individual 
ranking process; (c) the ‘individual reveal’ from each participant and (d) the group’s top five agreed behaviours. 
 
  
Participants were then shown the agreed ‘expert rankings’ and were 
given the opportunity to discuss any differences between their 
rankings and those of the security experts. The sessions lasted 
approximately one hour. Thus, we collected the ranked list of 
behaviours for every participant (n=20) and the ranked list of each 
group (n=5) as well as the qualitative discussions during the group 
ranking activity (n=5). 
Finally, the organisation’ security experts were briefed on the 
findings and allowed to reflect on these (see Section 3.3). 
3.1.1 Lessons Learned 
The Phase I deployment of the Cybersurvival Task provided us 
with very valuable feedback and led us to improve upon the 
procedures and materials for Phase II. Below we cover the most 
important lessons that we learned from Phase I. 
Experts expressed major interest in the reflection stage and viewed 
this as the most valuable aspect of the Task. However, its 
importance was not evident at the beginning of the task, thus 
leading to lower engagement with the initial ranking task. 
Therefore, in Phase II we were clearer with experts upfront about 
the entire process and highlighted the benefits of tailoring the initial 
set of behaviours to their own organisation.  
In Phase I we focussed on the ranking of the top 5 behaviours, 
which meant that subsequent discussion between the group 
members centred around those 5 behaviours with less discussion 
around the lowest-ranked items. In Phase II we decided to facilitate 
the ranking of the top and bottom 3 behaviours, thus resulting in a 
more balanced discussion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours.  
We also improved the presentation of the Cybersurvival Sheet 
based on feedback from participants. The most important change 
was numbering the behaviours on the sheet to facilitate discussion 
amongst participant (e.g. “cookies, number 7, should go below two 
factor authentication, number 17”). Feedback from participants 
also highlighted their appreciation for the laminated cards, so we 
continued using these facilitators during Phase II.  
Finally, we observed from the initial set of 4 workshops that the 
most insightful data was generated by the group ranking activity, 
where participants were forced to directly compare the pros and 
cons of behaviours which led to uncovering flawed mental models 
and/or shadow security measures, as well as exposing issues with 
the security policy. Thus, we altered the timings during Phase II to 
allow staff more time in the group ranking activity and less time in 
the expert reveal, where participants predominantly dismissed the 
expert rankings. 
3.2 Phase II Deployment 
The second phase involved a deployment of the revised 
Cybersurvival Task in a larger but structurally similar university 
(approximately 5,300 members of staff). This meant that the 
lessons learned from Phase I were appropriate to the new context 
and that the kinds of attacks and protective behaviours described 
were appropriate, recognising that universities are prime targets for 
attackers due to publicly-available information [50].  
The list of behaviours for Phase II was again developed through an 
initial workshop with security experts from that organisation – the 
Chief Information Security Officer and a Faculty deputy (see Table 
3 for ranked list). The format of the workshop was similar to that 
used in Phase I, with a greater emphasis on the potential benefits of 
the task during the initial briefing. The initial list of behaviours 
comprised the list from Phase I, plus additional behaviours that 
were recommended in the new organisation’s security policy. This 
resulted in the experts spending more time adding, removing, and 
rewording behaviours on the list in order to tailor it to their specific 
organisation. 
Again, the participants were 20 non-expert employees who were 
split into 4 groups of 5 participants each. In Phase II, we kept 
support and academic staff separate – with two groups of each. 
Note that while we chose to separate academic and support staff 
due to differences observed during Phase I, it is possible for 
organisations to separate staff as they see appropriate (e.g. by job 
role or subjective experience). In fact, the Cybersurvival Task can 
serve as an exercise for identifying potential subgroups of 
employees who may share similar misconceptions.  
Table 3: Final ranking of behaviours by the security experts 
for Phase II. Keys correspond to Figure 3. 
Ranking Behaviour Key 
1 Ask for advice ASK 
2 Save files to the network SAV 
3 
Use different passwords for accounts 
outside the organisation 
DIF 
4 Keep passwords safe if written down WRI 
5 Report any data loss incidents REP 
6 Turn on automatic software updates AUT 
7 
Do not disclose your personal password, 
even to the IT department 
DIS 
8 
Use anti-malware software and keep it up 
to date 
ANT 
9 Use strong passwords STR 
10 Educate yourself on how to avoid fraud EDU 
11 
Use additional authentication options 
(e.g. two-factor authentication) 
ADD 
12 
Restrict physical access to computers and 
removable media 
PHY 
13 
Check if website you’re visiting uses 
HTTPS 
HTT 
14 
Look at the URL bar to verify you are 
visiting intended website 
URL 
15 
Don’t open attachments from unknown 
senders 
UNK 
16 Don’t open unnecessary attachments UNN 
17 
Don’t click on links from unknown 
senders 
LIN 
18 
Don’t enter password when you click on 
a link in an email that takes you to a 
website that asks for the password 
PAS 
19 Clear browser cookies COO 
 
  
Participants were recruited via snowball emails across all Faculties 
of the university with the exception of Computing Science (who 
were excluded on the basis that they may have had particular 
cybersecurity expertise). Academic participants included PhD 
students, researchers and lecturers, while support participants 
included receptionists and staff in finance and human resources 
departments. All these ‘non-expert’ participants were compensated 
with a £10 voucher. 
 
Figure 2: Screenshot of the report produced for experts. 
The sessions consisted of a quick introduction by the facilitator, an 
individual ranking task followed by a ‘reveal’ of each participant’s 
top and bottom three behaviours (see Table 2 for activities and 
timings). Staff were given a chance to suggest new behaviours to 
add to the list. These were written on the board by the facilitator 
(see Figure 1). Participants were then asked to rank all the 
behaviours as a group with everyone having to agree on the final 
list at the end of the process. The group discussion was facilitated 
by a researcher for the top 3 and bottom 3 behaviours, and once 
those were agreed participants were allowed to continue with the 
group ranking activity unassisted. Once all participants were in 
agreement, the expert agreed list was shown to the group and they 
were allowed to discuss discrepancies both with the group and with 
the facilitator. Finally, participants were debriefed and allowed to 
go. 
We collected the ranked list of behaviours for every participant 
(n=20) and the ranked list of each group (n=5) as well as the 
qualitative discussions during the group ranking activity (n=5). 
Once all data was analysed, experts were briefed on the findings 
during the Reflection Stage (see below). 
3.3 Reflection 
The purpose of the reflection stage was to brief the organisational 
security experts on the findings from the workshops and collect 
their thoughts on the process and understand their reaction to the 
findings. In total, the session lasted 45 minutes. 
Half of the session consisted of an oral presentation describing the 
methodology of the Task, a reminder of their rankings, and an 
overview of the main findings including the graphs in Figure 3.  
A brief physical report was generated for the experts that 
summarised the purpose of the Task, the methodology used to 
collect the data, and the most salient findings (see Figure 2 for 
example). The main section contained a table that included each 
behaviour (ordered according to the expert ranking), the individual 
range for the employee scores, the individual mean rank for the 
scores, the group mean rank, and the expert rank (for easy 
comparison). The key reasons for the overall scores were also 
included. The behaviours were highlighted where the individual 
and group scores were markedly different – in green if the change 
resulted in a higher score, or red if it resulted in a lower score. In 
this specific case, different tables were created for academic and 
support staff to highlight the differences between the groups. 
Finally, a section with the main takeaways (summarising the most 
controversial opinions or differences) closed the report. 
Following the presentation, experts were engaged in a brief semi-
structured interview where they were asked to comment on the 
Cybersurvival Task and reflect on the findings. Experts were also 
encouraged to seek clarifications on conflicting behaviours and 
were asked about future actions based on the presented data. 
4. RESULTS 
Below we present both quantitative and qualitative results from 
Phase II, including insights from both employees and experts. The 
quantitative data was analysed by averaging the scores across 
groups for each behaviour (e.g. Ask for Advice). All tests carried 
out were two-tailed. The qualitative data was obtained from the 
employee discussions during the group ranking activities and was 
analysed using thematic analysis. 
4.1 Comparison of Rankings Between Experts 
and Staff 
The rankings of experts were plotted against those given by staff 
(academic and support). These are presented in Figure 3. The 
identity line (dotted) shows perfect calibration between experts and 
staff. However, the further away the behaviours are from the 
identity line, the bigger the discrepancy between staff and experts’ 
security priorities. Behaviours above the identity line represent 
those that are most important to staff, while those below the line 
represent behaviours that are most important to experts. Figure 3 
also shows the difference between those rankings made as 
individuals and those made following group discussion with arrows 
indicating the shift between mean individual and group scores. One 
important thing to note here is that group discussion seldom moves 
staff towards better agreement with the experts. This is important 
given the way that social norms can intervene in determining staff 
security priorities (e.g. [35]). This will be explored in more detail 
below. 
  
4.2 Discrepancies in Rankings 
At first glance, our graph shows poor calibration between experts 
and staff, with experts wanting staff to prioritise asking for advice 
and with staff (both academic and support) opting for the creation 
of strong passwords as their number one priority (again, an 
interesting issue in the light of recently shifting password advice).  
Strong passwords have been the subject of many campaigns and are 
one of the few ‘engineered’ behaviours that staff are likely to 
encounter (as password systems often force the inclusion of upper 
and lower case, numerical and special characters as a means of 
creating stronger passwords). There is a certain irony here, given 
the new advice of three random words issued by GCHQ. 
Interestingly, support staff were more aware than academic staff of 
the need to use different (unique) passwords for each account, 
something that could possibly be tied to their use of systems that 
could hold sensitive data (e.g. finance, student performance, 
student identity, etc.).  
A set of behaviours around not opening attachments or links from 
unknown senders were also seen as very important by academic and 
support staff but not so much by experts (who tended to place more 
trust in automated detection of malware). Similarly, checking 
URLs and checking HTTPS (to a lesser extent) were seen as 
important behaviours by the academic staff while they were rated 
low by the experts, although these behaviours were ranked as being 
less important after the group discussion and more in line with the 
expert scores. 
Experts prioritised asking for advice as the single most important 
behaviour, but this was very poorly ranked by staff who generally 
believed that asking for advice was unnecessary and they could not 
envisage a scenario when that would happen (see below). Reporting 
data loss and turning on automatic updates were also seen as less 
important by academic staff when compared with the expert agreed 
rankings. 
4.3 Individual vs. Group Rankings 
In order to understand the differences in individual and group 
rankings, we calculated the absolute difference between the staff 
scores and the expert agreed scores (i.e. expert ranking minus staff 
ranking) for each of the subgroups: academic staff’s individual 
rankings, academic staff’s group rankings, support staff’s 
individual rankings, and support staff’s group rankings. The lower 
the added score, the closer the rankings were to the expert ones (0 
= perfect, 361 = complete opposite). We then ran a Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test between the individual scores and the group 
scores to measure any significant changes to ranking scores that 
emerged as a function of group discussion (in relation to the expert 
ones). 
Table 4: Mean scores in the Cybersurvival Task (0 = perfect 
score; 361 = worst score). 
 Individual Score Group Score 
Academic Staff 131.13 131 
Support Staff 117.11 162 
 
We found no significant difference in individual and group 
rankings for academics, Z=-.140, p=.889. We did, however, find a 
significant difference in individual and group rankings for support 
staff where individual scores were higher (i.e. more secure) than 
group scores, Z =-2.668, p=.008.  
These results are worrying as they show that a group discussion 
about the importance of different cyber behaviours led to a 
weakening of the support staff’s cybersecurity position (i.e. more 
disagreement with experts). This finding is also reflected in a 
statistical comparison of academic and support staff, where a 
Mann-Whitney U test did not find a statistically significant 
difference in the performance of individuals, U=21, p=.167 but 
where there was a significant difference in group performance, 
with academic staff generating rankings that were much more 
closely aligned with experts, U=10, p=.011. 
4.4 Expert Assumptions 
Here we report some of the qualitative data from the discussions 
within the different groups. We start by detailing some of the 
assumptions made by security experts about staff behaviour. 
Firstly, experts were adamant that there was an onus on employees 
to learn about security threats and to educate themselves. This 
notion was thoroughly rejected by our employees who felt that such 
behaviour would be too time consuming:  
Academic Group 1 (Male): “Yeah, I 
think it’s one of the things on my list 
that, I would really like to do, but you 
never get the time to actually get 
Figure 3: Scatter Plots comparing the rankings of experts (X-axis) against academic staff (right) and support staff (left). Arrows 
show the shift from mean individual rankings to final group rankings (dots). See Appendix C for high quality graphs. 
  
around to it. Presumably the 
fraudsters are getting cleverer and 
cleverer, so you have to keep up to 
date with new ways of helping and 
keeping yourself stay safe” 
This is possibly one of our most predictable findings, given the 
extensive research literature on ‘productive security’ that notes the 
unrealistic and unacceptable ‘cost’ of cybersecurity policy 
compliance [7]. 
Secondly, experts assumed that users would save all their work 
regularly to the network drive in order to allow immediate 
restoration in the case of infections or attacks. In reality, this was 
common practice, but many staff chose convenience over security 
and downloaded a local working copy, which would then be 
uploaded to the network once access was no longer required.  
Support Group 2 (Female): Force of 
habit, it’s just a habit. I don’t not for 
any particular reason, just lazy I 
guess ‘cause it saves me the click for 
going into that, then going into that – 
and instead I’m like ‘it’s there on the 
desktop’. 
Support Group 2 (Male): A lot of the 
time for me it’s something that I’ll 
only need access to for a limited time 
so once I’m done with it I’ll just 
delete it. 
Finally, experts believed that users would report any data breaches 
immediately. Employees, however, questioned how they would 
know if a data breach had occurred: 
Support Group 2 (Female):“But how 
do you know that you‘ve lost 
something? I’m not sure I would 
recognise a data loss unless it said to 
me, ‘you’ve lost some data’.” 
This assumption highlights an important problem for experts: 
employees do not possess a concrete understanding of the 
consequences associated with cybersecurity – e.g. what actually 
happens when you have suffered a data breach? A possible remedy 
would appear to be for experts to contextualise advice and policy 
in order to encourage compliance.   
4.5 Employee Misconceptions and 
Disagreements 
Next, we explore employees’ misconceptions about security 
behaviours and their failures to come to any agreement about 
appropriate actions. Firstly, staff believed that software updates – 
whether applications or an operating system – were primarily a 
means to access new features, arguing that updates could be 
delayed without any adverse impact, a finding previously reported 
by Vaniea et al. [59]. 
Additionally, they erroneously believed that if the update was 
important, it would get pushed through by the IT staff regardless. 
This misconception is in line with work showing how updating 
software was rarely seen as a key security behaviour [60]. 
Academic Group 2 (Female 2): “I’ve got the turn on 
automatic software updates, because I thought 
software was quite general and there’s the other one 
that covers the anti-malware software – so any 
software updates could be anything. Uhm, that’s 
why I thought it was not specific to internet 
security” 
There was extended discussion regarding the threats from email 
attachments and links. While staff were generally aware that 
clicking or downloading items from emails could harm their 
computer, the exact nature of the harm was disputed. Some 
employees believed that links were more dangerous than 
attachments as clicking them automatically compromised the 
computer, while others argued that attachments were harmless if 
you did not allow them to install. While most points argued were 
true to an extent, it was worrying how varied their perspectives of 
the threats were. 
Academic Group 2 (Female 1): “But if you opened 
it, I wouldn’t anyway, but open an attachment from 
someone I didn’t know – I would just delete it – but 
if I did open it I would assume that unless I clicked 
on a link within that attachment then the attachment 
couldn’t, unless, you know like a Word attachment, 
if they sent me some kind of attachment that could 
be actually downloading a virus.” 
Academic Group 2 (Male 1): “I think an attachment 
is more important because that’s a file that you 
download to your computer and could potentially run 
directly on your computer” 
Academic Group 1 (Female 1): “to actually open an 
attachment itself may be important, because I know 
that you don’t need to put your password in and 
malware starts to come, and there are many of those 
everyday. So if we put that as a priority behaviour 
then we can prevent a lot of malware from coming 
in. And it’s very simple as well – that’s my opinion.” 
Academic Group 2 (Female 2): “The more that I 
talk the more I realise I don’t know” 
This last observation is important. Employees lacked a good mental 
model of the nature of the threat and the way that they could 
realistically guard against it. This led to disagreements about the 
most effective forms of protection. For example, there were heated 
discussions about writing passwords down, with the majority of 
participants agreeing that it was a ‘must not do’ behaviour and 
should be avoided at all costs. In the meantime, password reuse was 
seen as a negative, but necessary, behaviour – especially given that 
mapping personal accounts to work accounts would be difficult for 
attackers. This demonstrates a mental model where most staff 
prioritise the need to protect themselves against colleagues rather 
than against external threats. 
  
“Academic Group 2 (Female 3): See it’s funny 
because I’ve put keep passwords safe if written 
down before I’ve put use strong passwords because 
obviously if you have it written down it doesn’t 
matter how strong it is – people can get it. 
Academic Group 2 (Male 1): But if you’ve got it 
written down there is maybe only a handful of 
corrupt people who could get their hands on it…” 
While previous literature (e.g. [56]) has reported this as a flawed 
mental model, other work [14] argues that this might not actually 
be a serious security threat, while Zhang-Kennedy et al. [62] 
suggest that this rule should be changed, promoting the keeping of 
written down passwords secure. Again, these academic 
disagreements demonstrate the difficulties with generating security 
advice. Ultimately, both GCHQ and NIST have taken the stance of 
promoting secure storage of written down passwords in their new 
guidelines. 
4.6 The Sources of Guidance 
We now look at some of the issues around where employees would 
turn to for education and guidance. Firstly, as we noted, participants 
were reluctant to ask experts for advice as they felt it was time 
consuming and unnecessary. They seldom knew who they could 
turn to for advice either within the Department, the Faculty or the 
University. Participants generally agreed that learning from each 
other or from their own personal experience was more realistic than 
asking for advice from an expert: 
Academic Group 2 (Male 1): “I think people are 
more likely to ask their immediate colleagues for 
advice about things.” 
Support Group 2 (Female 1): “Would you not just 
tend to ask for advice once you’ve done something 
wrong or something bad has happened?” 
This is a problem when local knowledge is based upon poor mental 
models of both threat and effective deterrence. The tendency to rely 
upon peers and to trust social norms is a known problem in 
cybersecurity research, leading to the development of shadow 
security cultures within an organisation [36]. We know that teams 
do have an important role to play in the development of security 
behaviours, but we also know that these teams can appropriate 
security behaviours and practices, moulding them to better fit their 
own work context, but occasionally introducing vulnerabilities and 
misconceptions as a result [47].  
Our employees felt that they could not be expected to stay on top 
of the latest advice and information. They were aware of certain 
‘rules’ (such as not opening attachments and clicking on links) but 
they felt that they should not be held responsible for cyber defence 
as they could not be expected stay current with that knowledge and 
were unwilling to put extra time into learning. 
Support Group 2 (Female 3): “Yeah, just come and 
ask us – spend an hour educating you. I mean, 
nobody has that time, so…” 
Finally, employees recognised that certain issues were out of their 
control. They believed that the IT department was responsible for 
cyber defence and that this defence was primarily undertaken with 
automated detection and control systems. This is an interesting 
issue as it reflects the kinds of culture that evolves around staff who 
have restricted access in relation to installing or updating software. 
Knowing that IT services have control over such matters brings 
with it the assumption that staff have no real responsibilities in this 
area.  
Academic Group 1 (Male 2): “So the anti-malware 
thing, because it’s the university computer I just 
take it that’s it’s all sorted out anyway. It’s not like 
you’re meant to keep it up to date yourself 
personally.” 
Again, this speaks to the way that employees are empowered in the 
cybersecurity space. We know from the psychology literature on 
social loafing that in the presence of others, an individual user may 
not react to a request, assuming that others will make the required 
response [11, 22]. 
4.7 Feedback to Experts 
The final step in the Cybersurvival Task was to present the findings 
to the university experts. Below we cover the lessons learnt from 
that session as well as feedback regarding the findings and the 
methodology. 
Firstly, the experts were surprised at some of the misconceptions 
shown by employees. They had made assumptions that certain 
behaviours or terms were common knowledge, and the results of 
the exercise made them realise that extra effort was required to 
better understand their audience. 
CISO: “It forced us to re-evaluate our desired 
behaviours. Because, I have, based on years of 
experience, developed a prejudice towards certain 
desired behaviours that I now think, based on this, 
perhaps I’ve allowed that prejudice to drive my own 
personal baseline. And I think this tool helps break 
that and forces me to re-evaluate my concept of 
desired behaviours.” 
Secondly, experts took the output from the Cybersurvival Task as 
evidence that their one-size-fits-all training approach was failing 
the university.  
CISO: “One size fits all is a fallacy. It’s not going to 
work. You need to cater your risk management 
programmes specifically to the people within their 
respective work areas. I think that’s what I’m taking 
from this.” 
While this school of thought is not necessarily new for the academic 
security community, it is important to note that it is still being 
employed in organisations (this was a common finding across both 
Phases I & II). By utilising this tool, the CISO was able to make 
this realisation for himself and thus can seek more effective ways 
of promoting secure behaviours.  
Thirdly, they argued that the task would be an excellent tool for 
establishing a baseline prior to undertaking training development 
and then using this baseline data to deliver more targeted training: 
  
Faculty Deputy: “It’s critical because this provides 
a mechanism for determining, not to find out 
whether our programmes are successful, but 
whether our programmes are correctly designed 
and catered for the intended audience. Because 
that’s the initial hurdle. Because if the programme 
isn’t adapted for the culture then it will fail” 
Finally, experts expressed their support for the Cybersurvival Task, 
focusing on the fact that the issues raised by the tool were specific 
to their organisation: 
CISO: “I don’t think I’ve come across a tool that’s 
quite so powerful. I’ve come across metrics. I’ve 
challenged metrics, but this tool is different because 
it’s using my metrics that I’ve provided and 
compared them against other people’s metrics to see 
how they match and there’s no way I can argue 
against that data because it’s data that I’ve 
provided, as an individual, and data that other 
people have provided. I can’t see any weakness in 
there. I’m struggling to find a weakness. I think it’s 
a very powerful tool” 
We note here, that one useful aspect of the Cybersurvival Task is 
that the output for different staff groups can be easily quantified in 
terms of the kinds of visualisations shown in Figure 3. This was 
important as it is not easy to use purely qualitative data to illustrate 
discrepancies between the beliefs of different groups, but we found 
these illustrations, used in combination with the discussion data, 
were very effective as a means of organisation-specific highlighting 
issues. 
4.8 Summary of Findings 
The Phase II deployment of the Cybersurvival Task in a large 
institution involving two organisational security experts and 20 
employees demonstrated the benefits of this tool by highlighting 
differences between the cybersecurity beliefs and attitudes of 
security experts and employees. We also found that a group 
discussion around desired security behaviours actually led to less 
agreement between employees and experts, which raises interesting 
questions regarding the social construction of cybersecurity within 
workgroups and related issues of how best to disseminate security 
information in organisations.  
A follow up session with the organisational security experts found 
that they valued the information uncovered by the tool, and they 
had a clear understanding of how that information could be used to 
improve their organisation in the future – for example in 
understanding what content should be covered in mandatory 
training sessions. 
5. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we described two deployments of the Cybersurvival 
Task in two large universities and showed how the task revealed 
security misconceptions of staff and some behavioural 
discrepancies between security experts and employees. We 
specifically highlight how the organisation’s security experts were 
able to reflect upon flawed assumptions regarding certain employee 
behaviours, as well as realising how their approach to training was 
not fit for purpose. While the reported employee misconceptions 
are not all novel, it is important for the organisational experts to 
know which security issues exist within their realm so that they are 
able to address problematic behaviours or beliefs. Importantly, the 
fact that the task has highlighted some well-known behavioural 
issues serves as a sanity check that participants were being truthful 
and that the task is externally valid. 
Here, we discuss the benefits of using the Cybersurvival Task over 
other existing security behaviour measurement tools and explore 
how organisations can use the tool to improve training 
programmes, tailor their security policies, and understand the 
development of non-compliant attitudes and shadow security 
behaviours. We should note that the Cybersurvival Task has two 
quite discrete functions. Firstly, in keeping with the Desert Survival 
task and the Moon Landing task, the Cybersurvival Task can 
highlight individual and group opinion differences between staff 
groups and see how they are resolved. Secondly, the task can 
produce useful cybersecurity data about staff behaviours, 
understanding and possible compliance with security policies. We 
will explore these functions in more detail below. 
5.1 Measuring Individual and Group 
Decision-Making 
In terms of the first function – to observe the processes of individual 
and group decision making – it was very interesting to note the 
differences between groups within the organisation, but perhaps 
more intriguing to note that group discussion never resulted in more 
secure rankings overall, when compared to individual rankings. 
Indeed, in the case of support staff, group discussion resulted in a 
set of beliefs that were less secure (i.e. less aligned with expert 
opinion). Earlier we talked about this in relation to the development 
of a shadow security culture within the organisation in which social 
norms can come to dominate [36]. However, we should also note 
that this resonates with other studies using ranking tasks to measure 
group behaviour, when the dynamics of the group can result in sub-
optimal decisions. For example, in a ‘Desert Survival’ study 
involving mixed gender groups, expertise tended to be ignored in 
group settings if the experts were women, resulting in poor group 
performance, but not if they were men [57]. 
While it is certainly interesting to observe the differences between 
individual and group scores, some may argue that cybersecurity is 
predominantly an individual task. We disagree given the social 
nature of organisations and the data suggesting that users are more 
likely to turn to colleagues rather than experts for advice. However, 
it is possible to build the visual representations (e.g. Figure 3) using 
the individual scores, although we would recommend running the 
group ranking sessions regardless due to the insights they generate 
(see below). 
5.2 Measuring Cybersecurity Attitudes and 
Behaviours 
In terms of the second function of the task – to measure 
cybersecurity attitudes and behaviours – we should ask how the 
Cybersecurity Task compares with other available measures. The 
most obvious point of comparison – albeit serving a different 
purpose – is the Security Behaviour Intentions Scale (SeBIS) which 
was initially developed in 2015 with the aim of becoming the 
standard tool for assessing the security behaviours of end-users 
[19]. This has since been validated to show how some security 
behaviours can be reliably predicted using the scale [18]. One of 
the interesting differences between SeBIS (and self-reporting 
  
questionnaires in general) and the Cybersurvival Task is the request 
in the latter to rank behaviours, rather than indicate compliance 
level. There is no obvious ‘correct’ ranking and so we can attenuate 
the problem of ‘social desirability’ (giving the ‘right’ answers to 
questions irrespective of behaviour). Additionally, by having to 
justify priorities, participants in the Cybersurvival Task reveal 
underlying assumptions and/or flawed mental models that can then 
be used by experts to deliver appropriate remediation.  
However, there are two further issues that come to light when 
comparing tasks. The SeBIS is not resource heavy – it can be 
completed quickly and can therefore give organisations rapid, 
actionable data about the beliefs and reported behaviours of their 
staff. In contrast, the Cybersurvival Task when done properly 
(involving both individual and group stages) can be quite resource 
intensive but also allows for training opportunities while also 
providing a baseline measure of security knowledge within the 
organisation. This is not a negative thing if it results in greater 
understanding and ownership of the problem. In addition, the 
SeBIS has a static set of items to be used in any organisation, 
despite the fact that there are always disagreements over what items 
should be included and prioritised depending on the context (e.g. 
[32]). In contrast, the Cybersurvival Task, as we have described it, 
sees cybersecurity as an evolving process and adapts this list to 
those set up by a specific organisation. At the beginning of our 
study, we asked the organisation’s CISO to generate 19 important 
behaviours and compared these with the 16 items on SeBIS [19] 
and the 20 “good” behaviours identified by Ion et al. [32]. There 
was a substantial overlap, but our CISO added certain behaviours 
(ask for advice and educate yourself on how to avoid fraud) which 
he ranked very highly. Staff did not prioritise these items and so it 
would be easy to argue that they were unimportant, but this would 
be missing the point. The Cybersurvival Task is designed to show 
differences between the beliefs and opinions held by the CISO and 
those held by employee groups throughout the organisation. Where 
there is disagreement, then there is an opportunity to consider 
whether staff communication has been adequate or whether 
expectations are unrealistic. 
5.3 How Can Organisations Benefit from the 
Cybersurvival Task? 
It is clear from our expert feedback session that security experts in 
organisations make assumptions about their institution’s security 
culture and that these assumptions are not always correct. This 
means that organisations may not be providing staff with the 
necessary and/or relevant training programmes. While the 
Cybersurvival Task does not measure employee compliance – it is 
possible that employees engage in all behaviours on the list – it can 
be used to obtain a snapshot of security subcultures within an 
organisation, and to identify any misinformation that might be 
circulating in those subcultures. This would allow experts the 
opportunity to tailor solutions that would help prevent the 
proliferation of non-compliant security practices. 
The Cybersurvival Task can also serve as a sanity check for an 
organisation’s security policies. During the first step when the 
organisation’s security experts modify and rank the list of 
behaviours, they can identify any policy items that may no longer 
apply, or others that they may not have considered before. 
Additionally, this process should make experts aware of what the 
most important message to staff should be. The act of having to 
rank a particular behaviour as first or second on a list can give pause 
for thought – how are these important behaviours being 
communicated to staff across the organisation? Note, too, that 
rankings may change in keeping with the dynamic cybersecurity 
threat landscape.  
Lastly, it may be possible to use the Cybersurvival Task as a 
training tool, exploiting the way it can readily highlight 
misconceptions and promote discussions about why the experts 
prioritise certain behaviours and why staff might find these 
behaviours challenging to execute in their own work contexts. 
While such an approach would require a greater degree of co-
ordination (e.g. scheduling for both employees and experts), the 
direct outcome with regards to mutual understanding by both 
parties would seem to be beneficial. The task certainly generated 
high levels of engagement across all groups – something which is 
not always said of cybersecurity training material. 
5.4 Limitations and Future Work 
The most obvious limitation regarding this implementation of the 
Cybersurvival Task related to the time taken to conduct the 
workshops and collate and present the findings. Despite our 
participants finding it an enjoyable task, we do recognise that length 
could be an issue for both organisations and individuals. In future 
settings, the individual rankings could be completed online and 
analysed before the group meeting to discuss differences and agree 
a consensus ranking (thus speeding up the process). We are hesitant 
to suggest running the complete task online as it is currently 
presented, as this would miss out on valuable qualitative data that 
shows the reasoning behind the rankings and reveals any 
underlying misconceptions or erroneous mental models that 
management can then address. However, it may be possible to 
redesign some of the activities (e.g. the group ranking task) to 
accommodate digital technologies for carrying out the workshops 
in a distributed manner and reducing the time taken to complete 
them. 
We also recognise that our deployments have been restricted to 
academic organisations and so, in future work, we aim to take the 
tool into other sectors, streamlining some aspects of the data 
collection process, and exploring the automatic generation of 
reports. 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that security experts and staff do not 
always agree on the most important security behaviours and this 
will be a big concern for organisations. Ideally, all members of an 
organisation should be working towards the same security goals 
and should understand their role in achieving those goals, yet we 
have found that group discussions on cybersecurity behaviours in 
fact led to more disagreement between staff and expert priorities. 
We have shown that a simple ranking task, conducted individually 
and then in groups, can highlight such disagreements and illustrate 
the different normative beliefs held by specific staff groups as well 
as illustrating the differing priorities shown by security experts and 
employees at different levels of the organisation. We believe the 
Cybersurvival Task would be useful for any CISO seeking to 
understand the kinds of sub-optimal security subcultures that 
develop within their organisation. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Initial set of behaviours as presented to 
experts in Phase I.  
The original list of behaviours was obtained from Ion et al. (2015). 
Below they are presented unranked as seen by the security experts 
in Phase I. 
 
Behaviour 
Be suspicious of links 
Be sceptical of everything 
Turn on automatic updates 
Save passwords in a file 
Clear browser cookies 
Use a password manager 
Use 2-factor authentication 
Check if HTTPS 
Look at the URL Bar 
Install OS Updates 
Don’t click on links from unknown people 
Use strong passwords 
Use unique passwords 
Don’t write down passwords 
Visit only known websites 
Don’t open email attachments from unknown people 
Update applications 
Don’t enter passwords on links in emails 
Use antivirus software 
 
B. Ranked list of behaviours agreed by 
experts in Phase I. 
Our two security experts from Phase I were given the opportunity 
to add, remove, and rename behaviours from the original list 
(Appendix A). Below is the final agreed rank list from experts for 
Phase I. 
Ranking Behaviour 
1 Use strong passwords 
2 Use antivirus software 
3 Turn on auto software updates 
4 Check every message is genuine 
5 Keep OS up to date 
6 Be aware of fake phone calls 
7 Use different passwords 
8 Be suspicious of links 
9 Ask for advice when unsure 
10 Check URL bar 
11 Check if HTTPS 
12 Don’t download attachments from unknown senders 
13 Don’t enter password on website from link 
14 Don’t click links from unknown senders 
15 Update applications 
16 Only visit known websites 
17 Don’t write down passwords 
18 Use a password manager 
19 Use 2 factor authentication 
20 Clear cookies 
 
 
C. Scatter Plots Comparing Expert and Staff 
Rankings 
Here we present the higher quality versions of the scatter plots 
from Figure 3. These are omitted from the paper due to space. 
  
 
Figure C.1: Scatter Plots comparing the rankings of experts (X-axis) against support staff. Arrows show the shift from mean 
individual rankings to final group rankings (dots). 
Figure C.1: Scatter Plots comparing the rankings of experts (X-axis) against academic staff. Arrows show the shift from mean 
individual rankings to final group rankings (dots). 
